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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FRED N. HOBSON AND MARY 
HOBSON, his wife, 
Respondents, 
-vs-
PANGUITCH LAKE CORPORATION 
ETAL., 
Appellants, 
-vs-
DERRAL CHRISTENSEN, ET AL., 
Respondents, 
-vs-
DELLA D. MARSDEN, ET AL., 
Respondents. 
CASE NO. 
13615 
NEWLY UNCOVERED CASES 
OF HOBSON RESPONDENTS 
Because Appellant in its oral argument as 
well as in its Reply Brief filed just before hearing 
challenges a Rule of Property of long standing in this 
state and widely accepted in American Land Jurisprudence 
we respectfully ask the Court's consideration of these 
authorities uncovered after examining the Reply Brief. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Intrinsic to a determination of this case is the 
necessity to distinguish between boundary by aoquies-
1 o 
oenae and boundary by parol agreement . 
We have great respect for and accept as a rule of 
property boundary by aaquiesoenoe and Utah's long line of 
cases which synthesize it- Those cases define the rights 
of the parties where there has been a long period of 
acquiescence in a fence line but no proof that there was 
any agreement as to its location or that the parol agree-
ment resolved a pre-existing dispute. 
However, none of the cases developing boundary by 
aaquiesoenoe had as part of its material facts the existen 
of an actual agreement between the parties. It is only 
the boundary by aaquiesoenoe cases which Appellant, 
Panguitch Lake Corporation, cites. 
Accurately defined by Justice Crockett in Park Daughters 
Investment Company^ 29 U2d 42l> 511 P2d 145. 
> 
'Brown vs. Milliner, 120 U 16, 232 P2d 202; Tripp vs. Bagl 
74 U 57, 267 P 912; Rydalch vs. Anderson, 37 U 99, 107 P 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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I . BOUNDARY BY PAROL REAFFIRMED IN BROWN 
VS. MILLINERl DOES NOT REQUIRE A "LONG 
PERIOD OF ACQUIESCENCE" AND IS SUPPORTED 
ALMOST UNANIMOUSLY BY THE AUTHORITIES. 
In oral argument and in its Reply Brief 
Panguitch Lake Corporation claims Brown vs. Milliner, 
120 U 16, 232 P2d 202, is dicta in this pronouncement: 
"A review of the Utah cases involving boundary 
disputes reveals that it has long been 
recognized in this State that when the 
location of the true boundary between two 
adjoining tracts of land is unknown, 
uncertain or in dispute, the owners thereof, 
may, by parol agreement, establish the 
boundary line and thereby irrevocably bind 
themselves and their grantees." 
That statement, clearly requiring no long period 
of acquiescence, is not only not dicta as we will demon-
strate hereinafter, but represents the great weight of 
authority. 
All the following cases hold that a period of 
acquiescence less than the statutory period for adverse 
possession is sufficient to establish boundary by parol 
where a fence line is agreed upon between the parties. 
120 U 16, 232 P2d 202. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ALA. Guy vs. Lancaster3 34 So. 2d 10 3 250 Ala 256. 
ARK. Havlik vs. Freeman, 218 SW2d 364
 3 214 Ark 761. 
FLA. (U.S.C.A applying Florida law) International 
Paper Co. vs. Bridges3 279 F2d 536. 
GA. Collins vs. Birchfield3 110 SE2d 368; 
Clay vs. Stanfield3 119 SE2d 564; 
Eethcook vs. Padgett3 122 SE2d3 213. 
IDA. Campbell vs. Weisbrod3 45 P2d 1052. 
ILL. Ginther vs. Duginger3 129 NE2d 147; 6 III 2d 4 
Cienki vs. Russell, 75 NE2d 3723 398 III 77; 
Skinner vs. Furman3 88 NE2d 867 3 404 III 356. 
KAN. Spencer vs. Supemois3 268 P2d 946 3 176 Kan 13 
Appeal of Moore3 252 P2d 8753 173 Kan 820. 
MICH. Becker vs. Weaver, 202 NW2d 439; 
Cochran vs. Milligan3 101 NW2d 292; 
Jackson vs. Deernar3 127 NW2d 856; 
Johnson vs. Squires3 75 NW2d 453 344 Mich 687; 
Escher vs. Bender3 61 NW2d 1433 338 Mich I. 
NEB. Phillips vs. Horn3 196 NW2d 3823 188 Neb 304. 
NEW MEX. Sanchez vs. Scott3 516 P2d 6673 85 N.M. 695 
WASH. Johnston vs. Monahan3 469 P2d 931. 
WISC. Thiel vs. Damarau3 66 NW2d 7473 268 Wis 76. 
Some of these cases hold that there need be no 
period of acquiescence if the boundary is fixed by an 
agreement resolving a bona fide controversy based upon 
doubt concerning the true line followed by erection of a 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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permanent boundary. 
No case we have found requires acquiescence or 
possession beyond the statutory period for adverse poss-
ession. 
KeHgan vs. Thomas, 281 So.2d 410, says that all 
that is required is: 
"Sufficient time to show a settled recog-
nition of the permanent boundary." 
The Michigan case of Becker vs. Weaver holds that 
there is no legal justification for imposing the minimum 
statutory time where the boundary is based upon a parol 
agreement. 
A mutual promise to abide by the results is suffi-
cient consideration for an agreement between co-terminus 
owners of land as to an uncertain boundary line. Guy vs. 
Lancaster, 34 S02d 10, 250 Ala 256. 
The parol agreement is not. a violation of the 
Statute of Frauds because it does not transfer an 
interest in land but is a determination of the location 
of the existing estates. Tripp vs. Bagley, 74 U 57, 
276 P 912. See Brown vs. Milliner, 232 P2d at 207. 
Tripp vs. Bagley holds that there are two ways a Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
nm • J «» 
fencetine may establish a boundary in employing this 
language: 
* * *. It is therefore clear that defendants1 
claim to the land in controversy must 
stand or fall either upon an express 
agreement fixing the boundary line OR 
upon acquiescence in the boundary line 
between the land owned by Plaintiff 
and that owned by defendant.[74 U at Page 66.] 
No Utah case is to the contrary. 
In their Reply Brief the Appellants insist that 
all the foregoing statements are merely dictum. This is 
simply not true. 
Mere possession of real property without payment 
of taxes will never ripen into title (78-12-12 UCA 1953); 
therefore this Court to support the doctrine of boundary 
by acquiescence was obliged to adopt, as an essential 
predicate, boundary by parol. How has the Court done so' 
By clothing long acquiescence with a presumption that a 
contract in fact existed. 
Thus, the only office which "long acquiescence" 
ful fills is the two-fold purpose to provide (1) an 
irrebutable presumption that a parol agreement was enterec 
into and (2) A rebuttal presumption that said agreement Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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was consummated due to a dispute or uncertain con-
cerning location of the true boundary. Motzkus vs. 
Carroll, 7 P2d 237, 322 P2d 391. 
Justice Crockett's concurring opinion in Hummel 
vs. Young, I P2d 237, 265 P2d 410, is to the effect 
that an express contract is not necessary to the esta-
blishment of a boundary line by acquiescence, implying 
that if an express contract is proved a long period of 
acquiescence is not essential 
Contrary to being a dictum the identical state-
ments in Brown vs. Milliner, Tripp vs. Bagley and Rydalch 
vs. Anderson that the parties may, by parol agreement, 
establish the boundary line and thereby irrevocably 
bind themselves and their grantees, those statements 
are an intrinsic element of the ratio decedendi of the 
rule of boundary by acquiescence. 
The doctrime of boundary by parol agreement is a 
part of the ratio decedendi in all these Utah cases be-
cause in none was there any evidence of an agreement, oral 
or otherwise. In no case ever decided by this Court was 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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there presented an accumulation of facts where all of 
the elementsof boundary by parol were present. 
Thus, the rule of Brown vs. Milliner, Tripp vs. Bag-
ley and Rydalch vs. Anderson that when a parol agreement 
is executed by erection of a fence it will be enforced, 
is a pivotal element the Court must utilize in order to 
make a perfected property right out of land affected by 
the rule of boundary by acquiescence. To get from 
the point of an unwritten establishment of the respective 
estates between co-terminus owners to the point where 
the fence, having been acquiesed in for a "long period 
of time" determines the boundary, the Court must some-
where along the line imply, infer, or establish by 
presumption, that there was an agreement between the 
parties. 
Thus, Rydalch, Tripp and Brown synthesize this 
rule: 
If there is no actual proof of the 
elements of boundary by parol, then a 
long period of acquiescence in the 
fence supplies the presumption of an 
agreement between the parties. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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In the case now before the Court all the essential 
elements of boundary by parol agreement are proved without 
contradiction or qualification: 
1] Hobson and Marsden were adjoining proprietors 
( R.252, 293-295) 
2] Hobson wanted to know where his lines were going 
to be (R.248, 146) 
3] Hobson wanted a survey (R.146) 
4] Marsden declined assuring Hobson he "knew his 
land weir (R. 146) 
5] A boundary was agreed upon between the parties 
(R.185) 
6] The boundary line was clearly marked on the 
ground by a third party while the adjoining 
proprietors were present (R.140-225) 
7] A substantial permanent fence was established 
along the line (R.185-188, 276) 
8] Both parties rely on the fence (R.400) 
9] The fenceline is torn down ten years later unilaterallj 
by the Defendants (R.353, 354) 
10] The fence stood as the boundary up to which both 
parties occupied for much longer than Utah Statute 
of Limitations for adverse possession (78-12-5 et seq. 
UCA 1953). 
In additional to those facts, Hobson built a 
subdivision using the established fenceline as his west Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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boundary (R.40Q), sold lots from said subdivision 
staked on the ground as though the west boundary of 
his subdivision were the west boundary of the sectional 
subdivision (R.401, 402). Hobson had no reason to sus-
pect otherwise. Hobson paid taxes on an increased 
assessment (R.402) and upon lots which were actually 
within this disputed tract of land (R.265-290; 403). 
Ringwood vs. Bradford, 2 U2d 119, 269 P2d 1052; 
Jensen vs. Bartlett, 4 U2d 58, 286 P2d 804 and Ekberg 
vs. Bates, 121 U 122, 239 P2d 205, are all cases where 
there was insufficient evidence of one of the elements of 
boundary by parol agreement and the Court applied the 
presumption or indulged the fiction that the absent 
elements or those which have not been supported by the 
proof were present. 
"Acquiescence" in those cases only supplies a 
presumption that there was an agreement at a time when 
the true location of the boundary was unknown, uncertain, 
or in dispute. 
If a boundary can be established by a presumption 
why cannot the same boundary be established by actual 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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proof of the facts presumed. 
We respectfully submit that the rule of Brown 
vs. .Milliner3 Tripp vs. Bagley^ Rydalch vs.. Anderson is no 
dictum but is an established, settled law of this state, 
an important rule of property therein, and in harmony 
with the overwhelming weight of authority. 
CONCLUSION 
Boundary by parol agreement is an integral 
part of this Court's well-established rule of boundary 
by acquiescence. 
Because mere possession without payment of 
taxes will never ripen into title (78-12 UCA 1953) this 
Court, to support the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 
was obliged to adopt, as an essential predicate, boun-
dary by parol. This Court has done so by clothing 
long acquiescence with a presumption that a parol 
agreement existed - which was the product of uncertainty, 
doubt or dispute between adjoining proprietors, and which 
culminated in erection of the boundary fence. 
If boundary by parol agreement is rejected, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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boundary by long acquiescence is destroyed. 
Respectfully submitted. 
Ken Chamberlain, Attorney for 
Hobson Respondents 
SERVED the within and foregoing Brief of Newly Uncovered 
Cases upon the following by mailing two (2) full, true, 
and correct copies thereof, U. S. Mail, Postage Prepaid, 
this 26th day of November, 1974: 
J. Anthony Eyre, Kipp & Christian, Attorneys for 
Appellants, 520 Boston Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah (84111) 
Thorpe Waddingham, Attorney for Respondents, 
Delta, Utah (84624) 
Paul M. Hansen, Attorney for Respondent, 819 Oak 
Street, Ogden, Utah 
Ken Chamberlain 
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